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Abstract 
Adherence to social norms is compromised in a variety of neuropsychiatric conditions. 
Functional neuroimaging studies have investigated social norm compliance in healthy 
individuals, leading to the identification of a network of fronto-subcortical regions that 
underpins this ability. However, there is a lack of corroborative evidence from human lesion 
models investigating the structural anatomy of norm compliance across this fronto-
subcortical network. To address this, we developed a neuroeconomic task to investigate 
social norm compliance in a neurodegenerative lesion model: behavioural variant 
frontotemporal dementia, a condition characterised by gross social dysfunction. The task 
assessed norm compliance across three behaviours that are well studied in the 
neuroeconomics literature: fairness, prosocial and punishing behaviours. We administered 
our novel version of the Ultimatum Game in 22 behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia 
patients and 22 age-matched controls, to assess how decision-making behaviour was 
modulated in response to 1) fairness of monetary offers, and 2) social context of monetary 
offers designed to produce either prosocial or punishing behaviours. Voxel-based 
morphometry was used to characterise patterns of grey matter atrophy associated with task 
performance. Acceptance rates between patients and controls were equivalent when only 
fairness was manipulated. However, patients were impaired in modulating their decisions in 
response to social contextual information. Patients’ performance in the punishment condition 
was consistent with a reduced tendency to engage in punishment – this was associated with 
decreased grey matter volume in the anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal cortex, left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and right inferior frontal gyrus. In the prosocial condition, patients’ 
performance suggested a reduced expression of prosocial behaviour, associated with 
decreased grey matter in the anterior insula, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate and 
dorsal striatum. Acceptance rates in the Ultimatum Game were also significantly related to 
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impairments in the everyday expression of empathic concern. In conclusion, we demonstrate 
that compliance to basic social norms (fairness) can be maintained in behavioural variant 
frontotemporal dementia, however more complex normative behaviours (prosociality, 
punishment) that require integration of social contextual information are disrupted in 
association with atrophy in key fronto-striatal regions. These results suggest that the 
integration of social contextual information to guide normative behaviour is uniquely 
impaired in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia, and may explain other common 
features of the condition including gullibility and impaired empathy. Our findings also 
converge with previous functional neuroimaging investigations in healthy individuals and 
provide the first description of the structural anatomy of social norm compliance in a 
neurodegenerative lesion model. 
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Introduction 
Decisions in social contexts are complex and often require compromise between self-interest 
and consideration of others. Ever implicit in such decision-making is a regard for social 
norms – that collective sentiment of what constitutes appropriate behaviour, which is so 
fundamental to adaptive human interaction (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). Despite recent 
advances (Spitzer et al., 2007, Baumgartner et al., 2011, Ruff et al., 2013), very little is 
known regarding the neurobiology of social norm compliance. Even more pressing is the 
need for a framework to account for dysfunctional social norm compliance, which 
underscores symptoms across a range of neuropsychiatric conditions.   
 
Certain social normative behaviours are increasingly studied in the neuroeconomics 
literature. These include the tendency to engage in prosocial behaviours such as fairness or 
altruism, and the tendency to enact punishment upon others who violate social norms 
(Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). Despite the diversity of social norms at play, insights from the 
field of neuroeconomics implicate a distinct network of fronto-striatal-insular regions that 
appears to mediate compliance to social norms (Sanfey et al., 2003, Spitzer et al., 2007, 
Baumgartner et al., 2011, Chang and Sanfey, 2013, Ruff et al., 2013, Gabay et al., 2014, Ruff 
and Fehr, 2014).      
 
The behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a neurodegenerative condition 
with insidious, progressive change in personality and social interactions, represents the 
prototypical example of disordered social norm compliance. Patients commonly exhibit 
behavioural changes considered under this rubric, including loss of empathy and insight, 
disinhibited remarks or behaviour, egocentricity, impulsive spending or gambling, and 
gullibility (Piguet et al., 2011). Intriguingly, the earliest sites of pathology overlap with those 
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regions implicated in social norm compliance, most notably in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, anterior cingulate, insula, amygdalae and striatum (Broe et al., 2003, Seeley et al., 
2008, O'Callaghan et al., 2014, Bertoux et al., 2015). Decision-making paradigms 
traditionally used in the literature, which typically involve monetary gambles under 
conditions of risk and ambiguity, are found to have limited utility in bvFTD (Gleichgerrcht et 
al., 2010, Bertoux et al., 2013, Kloeters et al., 2013). Convergent approaches incorporating 
measures of social processing and decision-making represent a promising avenue to better 
detect the complex social-contextual deficits that typify bvFTD (Ibañez and Manes, 2012).  
 
The Ultimatum Game, a paradigm drawn from the neuroeconomics literature, offers a means 
of gauging normative decision-making behaviours in a social context. The task requires 
participants to either accept or reject monetary offers, varying in their degree of ‘fairness’. A 
consistent observation is that healthy participants frequently reject unfair offers, in order to 
punish their opponent, even though this decision incurs a personal cost (Güth et al., 1982, 
Sanfey et al., 2014). Such unfair offers are considered a violation of ‘fairness norms’ and 
therefore deserve sanctioning (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).  
 
Here, we sought to investigate social normative behaviour in bvFTD by introducing social 
contextual factors in the Ultimatum Game. In this novel manipulation, we included ‘social 
framing’ conditions intended to either induce participants to accept more offers due to 
compassion/desire to help (prosocial), or to incite the desire to punish via rejecting more 
offers (punishing). Fairness behaviour has deep developmental roots (Fehr et al., 2008, 
Castelli et al., 2014), and examples of altered responses to fairness on the Ultimatum Game 
have been attributed to states of exaggerated emotional reactivity (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007, 
Crockett et al., 2008) which is not present in bvFTD. Because of this, we predicted that 
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fairness behaviours may remain robust in bvFTD and that patients would demonstrate intact 
expression of fairness and thus perform similarly to healthy controls in the classic Ultimatum 
Game. However, in contrast, we predicted patients would have difficulty adapting their 
behaviour to engage in prosocial or punishing choice in the social framing conditions, as they 
require the integration of social contextual factors, an ability specifically known to be 
disrupted in bvFTD (Ibañez and Manes, 2012). We anticipated that patients’ abnormal 
expression of social norms in the social framing conditions would correlate with grey matter 
loss in discrete regions within the fronto-subcortical network previously implicated in social 
norm compliance.     
 
Materials and methods  
Case selection  
Twenty-two bvFTD patients were recruited from the FRONTIER dementia clinic, at 
Neuroscience Research Australia. All patients met current consensus criteria for bvFTD 
(Neary et al., 1998, Rascovsky et al., 2011). Twenty-two age- and education-matched healthy 
controls were selected from a volunteer panel. The Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE) 
was administered as a measure of general cognition. The Frontotemporal Dementia Rating 
Scale (FRS; (Mioshi et al., 2010)) was used as a measure of clinical staging for the patients. 
In brief, the FRS is an informant-rated staging scheme validated for use in bvFTD, tapping 
into a variety of behavioural and functional symptoms. Lower percentage scores on the FRS 
indicate more severe impairment, with six stages ranging from very mild to profound. The 
study was approved by the local Ethics Committees and all participants provided informed 
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. See Table 1 for demographic details 
and clinical characteristics. 
 
  O’Callaghan et al.  
7 
Background Neuropsychology 
General neuropsychological tests to assess executive function and memory were administered 
to both patients and controls. Executive function measures included attention and working 
memory assessed via the digit span task (total score of digits repeated forwards and 
backwards; (Wechsler, 1997)). To assess psychomotor speed and attentional set-shifting, the 
Trail Making Test, parts A and B, were administered (Spreen, 1998). Verbal memory 
encoding and retrieval were assessed using the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT; 
(Lezak, 2004), sum of trials 1-5 and the delay score, respectively. Copying and short-term 
visual recall were assessed using the Rey Osterrieth Complex Figure (Meyers, 1995).   
 
Capacity for Empathy 
The Cambridge Behavioural Inventory-Revised (CBI-R; (Wear et al., 2008) was used to 
assess behavioural disturbance in the patients. The CBI-R is a 45 item informant-rated 
questionnaire probing a variety of neuropsychiatric, cognitive and functional symptoms, 
rating their frequency of occurrence from 0 (never) to 4 (constantly). As such, higher CBI-R 
scores indicate greater behavioural dysfunction. To specifically assess empathy, we extracted 
scores from the item that best exemplifies deficits in this ability: “Appears indifferent to the 
worries and concerns of family members”. Importantly, this question addresses empathic 
concern – an aspect of empathy primarily affected in bvFTD (Baez et al., 2014).  
 
Ultimatum Game 
We created a modified Ultimatum Game with baseline and reappraisal versions, using the 
same monetary amounts and fair to unfair offer ratios that have been previously described 
(Koenigs and Tranel, 2007). In both the baseline and reappraisal versions, participants acted 
in response to different proposers who offered to split a hypothetical $10 with them. The 
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proposer - responder offers ranged from fair ($5 - $5; $6 - $4), to unfair ($7 - $3; $8 - $2; $9 - 
$1). Based on previous findings (Güth et al., 1982), including those validated in neurological 
patients and in older adults (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007), we operationalised ‘fair’ acceptance 
rates as the average of $5 - $5 or $6 - $4, and the ‘unfair’ as the average of $7 - $3, $8 - $2 
and $9 - $1 acceptance rates.           
 
In the baseline condition, participants were informed they would play against 22 different 
people, each of whom had been given $10 to divide. It was explained that proposers were free 
to decide how to split the money, but participants could choose whether to accept the offer 
(resulting in a payout for both players) or reject the offer (resulting in $0 for both). An 
example of baseline trials is shown in Figure 1 (a). In each trial a black and white photograph 
of a neutral face, with the caption “[name] has made you an offer” was presented on a 
computer screen for 3.5 seconds. This was followed by a decision screen where the offer was 
stated, e.g., “[name] gets $7, you get $3”, and a prompt to either “accept” or “reject”. This 
decision screen was displayed until a response was made, followed by a feedback screen of 
“you get $3” or “you both get $0” (4 seconds) depending on the response made.  
 
In the social framing version, participants were informed they would play against a set of 22 
new people, each given $10 to divide, with the same contingences applying for accepting or 
rejecting offers. However, now they were provided information about the proposers’ current 
circumstances. The prosocial condition framed proposers as poor, or ‘down on their luck’, 
and was designed elicit a higher acceptance rate on the basis that participants should feel 
sorry for the proposer. The punishing condition framed proposers as rich to encourage higher 
rejection rates or punishing behaviour, as the offers (particularly the unfair ones) should 
evoke a heightened sense of unfairness. Social framing trials are exemplified in Figure 1, (b) 
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and (c). As in the baseline condition, in each trial a black and white photograph of a neutral 
face was presented, followed by a description screen (4.5 seconds). Descriptions were 
restricted to brief and uncomplicated language. Examples of the prosocial condition included 
“[name] lost his/her house in a fire”, “[name] is saving for his/her son's operation”, “[name] 
is homeless” and examples of the punishing condition included “[name] owns an 
international company”, “[name] just won the lottery”, “[name] is a wealthy investment 
banker”. A decision screen with the offer followed, then a feedback screen. To ensure 
patients understood the terminology (i.e., that winning the lottery or being a wealthy 
investment banker would be associated with being rich; or being homeless would be 
associated with being poor etc.), a checklist was administered at the end of the experiment. 
All patients included in the study demonstrated intact understanding of the social framing 
terminology.  
 
In both the baseline and social framing conditions the 22 trials comprised two of each fair 
offer and six of each unfair offer. To control for possible gender biases deriving from the 
stimulus set, within each condition half of the presented faces were female and half male. In 
addition, the offer amounts were paired with proposers on a random cycle, to control for the 
possibility that features of a proposer (for example, physical attractiveness) might induce 
systematic response biases. The photos were of neutral expressions across all conditions, to 
further reduce the possibility of eliciting response biases on the basis on perceived 
friendliness/unfriendliness. For the social framing condition, an equal mix of prosocial and 
punishing descriptors made up the 22 trials, and these were presented in a randomised order. 
Each participant completed the baseline version first, followed by the social framing version. 
Participants were not awarded actual monetary payouts in relation to the task and were not 
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compensated for their participation; they were, however, instructed to make their choices on 
the basis of how they would act in a real-life situation.     
 
For the Ultimatum Game, the outcome measures were percentage acceptance rates for fair 
and unfair offers in each of the conditions. Further to this, we created percentage scores to 
reflect ‘change from baseline’ in the social framing conditions, in order to see both the extent 
and direction that acceptance rates deviated from baseline in response to the social framing 
information. The extent of each participants ‘change from baseline’ scores were calculated by 
subtracting acceptance rates in the prosocial/punishing conditions from baseline acceptance 
rates, then taking the reciprocal of this to represent directionality of the change. These change 
scores were calculated separately for fair and unfair offers.    
 
Behavioural analysis  
Demographics and background neuropsychology variables were analysed by two-tailed 
independent samples t-tests, using SPSS v. 22 (Chicago, IL, USA). For the Ultimatum Game, 
we analysed our results by estimating a logistic GEE  (generalised estimating equations) 
model with an exchangeable working correlation structure, which accounts for within-
subjects correlation across decisions. We did not use a repeated-measures ANOVA analysis 
on proportions (i.e., rejection rates) for two reasons: the ANOVA assumption of variance 
homogeneity is violated for categorical data, and ANOVA does not respect the upper and 
lower bounds of 0 and 1 for proportions (see (Jaeger, 2008) for a more complete exposition 
of arguments favouring a logit specification over ANOVA for categorical variables). The 
binary dependent variable is the decision to accept or reject an offer, and the independent 
variables are a three-way factorial of the fairness level (fair vs. unfair acceptance rates), 
group membership (control vs. bvFTD) and the social framing condition (baseline vs. 
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punishing vs. prosocial), as well as a set of control variables. Variables were introduced in the 
main analysis to control for the effects of gender, given previous evidence of gender effects 
in the Ultimatum game (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and also to control for the impact of 
patients’ cognitive deficits on Ultimatum Game performance. We controlled for gender by 
including a main effect of gender, and two-way interactions of gender with condition, 
fairness, and group. We controlled for cognitive ability using neuropsychological variables 
covering three cognitive domains (i.e., episodic memory as measured by the RAVLT delay 
score; speeded set-shifting as indexed by the TMT-B; attention/working memory as assessed 
by Digit Span total). Consequently, all of the results presented in the main text have been 
controlled for the possible effects of these variables. All results marked as “post-hoc 
comparisons” are corrected for multiple comparisons using the Sidak correction. Note, 95% 
confidence intervals of effects will be presented throughout in […]. GEE analyses were 
conducted using the Stata 13 software package (Stata Corporation, College Station, Tx).  
 
Imaging acquisition 
Whole-brain T1 images were acquired using 3T Philips MRI scanners with standard 
quadrature head coil (8 channels). The 3D T1-weighted sequences were acquired as follows: 
coronal orientation, matrix 256 x 256, 200 slices, 1 x 1 mm2 in-plane resolution, slice 
thickness 1 mm, TE/TR = 2.6/5.8 ms.  
 
Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analysis  
3D T1-weighted sequences were analysed with FSL-VBM, a voxel-based morphometry 
analysis (Ashburner and Friston, 2000, Good et al., 2001), part of the FSL software package 
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslvbm/index.html (Smith et al., 2004). First, tissue 
segmentation was carried out using FMRIB’s Automatic Segmentation Tool (FAST) (Zhang 
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et al., 2001) from brain extracted images. The resulting grey matter partial volume maps were 
then aligned to the Montreal Neurological Institute standard space (MNI152) using the 
nonlinear registration approach (FNIRT (Andersson et al., 2007a, Andersson et al., 2007b)), 
which uses a b-spline representation of the registration warp field (Rueckert et al., 1999). 
Registered partial volume maps were then modulated (to correct for local expansion or 
contraction) by dividing them by the Jacobian of the warp field. The modulated images were 
then smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel with a standard deviation of 3 mm (full 
width half maximum = 8 mm). On the basis of previous studies that defined neural correlates 
of the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003) and social norm processing (Spitzer et al., 
2007) across various prefrontal, striatal and limbic regions, we created a region-of-interest 
(ROI) mask using the Harvard-Oxford cortical and subcortical structural atlases. The 
following bilateral atlas regions were included in the mask: frontal pole, frontal orbital 
cortex, subcallosal cortex, frontal medial cortex, superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, 
inferior frontal gyrus, cingulate gyrus (anterior division), paracingulate gyrus, caudate, 
putamen, nucleus accumbens, insula cortex and amygdala.  
 
Group differences in grey matter intensity between patients and controls, within the fronto-
subcortical mask, were compared using a voxelwise general linear model (GLM). Significant 
clusters were formed by employing the threshold-free cluster enhancement (TFCE) method 
(Smith and Nichols, 2009). The TFCE method is a cluster-based thresholding method which 
does not require the setting of an arbitrary cluster forming threshold (e.g., t,z). Instead, it 
takes a raw statistics image and produces an output image in which the voxel-wise values 
represent the amount of cluster-like local spatial support. The TFCE image is then turned into 
voxel-wise p-values via permutation testing. We employed a permutation-based non-
parametric testing with 5000 permutations (Nichols and Holmes, 2002). Differences in grey 
  O’Callaghan et al.  
13 
matter intensity between patients and controls were assessed via t-tests, tested for 
significance at p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons via Family-wise Error (FWE) 
correction across space.   
 
Following this, correlations between Ultimatum Game performance and grey matter intensity 
were conducted. Both patients and controls were included in the analysis, to add greater 
variance in the behavioural scores thereby increasing the study’s statistical power to detect 
brain-behaviour relationships (Sollberger et al., 2009, Irish et al., 2014). The ‘change from 
baseline’ scores for unfair offers in both the positive and negative social framing conditions 
were entered as covariates in separate GLM matrices. For additional statistical power, a 
covariate only statistical model with either a positive or negative t-contrast was used. These 
contrasts were applied to test the association between the degree of patients’ abnormal 
behavioural performance in the social framing condition (i.e., if acceptance rates were lower 
in the prosocial condition or higher in the punishing condition) and grey matter loss. 
Therefore, a positive t-contrast was applied to ‘change from baseline’ in the prosocial 
condition, in order to index an association between decreasing grey matter volume and extent 
of lowered acceptance rates. A negative t-contrast was applied to ‘change from baseline’ 
scores in the punishing condition, which indexed an association between decreasing grey 
matter volume and the extent of higher acceptance rates.  Positive and negative contrasts 
were tested with 5000 permutations and reported at a significance level of p < .001 
uncorrected and at a cluster threshold of greater than 35 contiguous voxels.    
 
Results 
Demographics and background neuropsychology 
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As shown in Table 1, patients and controls were not significantly different for age and 
education levels (t values -.02 and 2.0, p values .985 and .061). Patients had significantly 
lower MMSE scores (t = 6.1, p < .001). In terms of background neuropsychology, patients 
had significantly slower psychomotor speed on TMT-A (t = -2.2, p < .05). Patients also had 
worse working memory/attention, speeded set-shifting and visuospatial copying (digit span: t 
= 5.6, p < .001; TMT-B: t = -4.9, p < .001; RCF copy: t = 3.7, p < .01). Patients’ scores were 
significantly reduced across verbal and non-verbal memory encoding and retrieval (RAVLT 
1-5: t = 6.5, p < .001; RAVLT delay: t = 5.5, p < .001; RCF 3 minute delay: t = 3.2, p < .01).       
 
Ultimatum Game baseline condition  
Acceptance rates in the baseline condition are shown in Figure 2. The group by fairness level 
interaction was not significant (2(1) = 0.03, p = 0.870). The main effect of group was not 
significant (2(1) = 0.69, p = 0.405), but there was a significant main effect for fairness level 
(2(1) = 53.83, p < 0.0001). The acceptance rates for both controls and bvFTD patients fell 
significantly in the unfair condition compared to the fair condition by 35.5% [19.6%-51.4%] 
and 37.4% [23.1%-51.7%], respectively. The absence of a significant interaction between 
fairness and group implies that the acceptance rates of the two groups were not significantly 
different within both the fair and unfair condition. Consequently, both patients and controls 
exhibited a normative response to the fairness manipulation, that is, accepting significantly 
fewer unfair offers. See Supplementary Figure 1, panel a) for a graphical representation of 
acceptance rates at each fairness level.     
 
Social framing conditions 
This section compares acceptance rates across the two social framing conditions (punishing 
vs. prosocial), as illustrated in Figure 3. The overall three-way interaction of fairness level, 
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social framing and group was not significant (2 (1)=2.63, p=0.105). The fairness by group 
interaction was not significant (2 (1)=0.99, p=0.319), indicating that response rates in both 
controls and patients were modulated to a similar degree by fairness level – a similar pattern 
to that seen in the baseline condition. By contrast, social framing interacted with fairness (2 
(1)=12.96, p<0.001). More importantly, there was also a significant social framing by group 
interaction (2 (1)=8.75, p<0.01), such that the social framing condition modulated the 
responses of both groups differentially. 
 
For the social framing by fairness interaction, post-hoc comparisons revealed that for unfair 
offers the increase in the acceptance rate comparing the punishing to the prosocial conditions, 
29.3% points [21.1%-37.5%], was significant (2 (1)=64.05, p<0.0001). However, 
acceptance rates for fair offers were not significantly different across the punishing and 
prosocial conditions (2 (1)=2.80, p=0.179). 
 
Regarding the social framing by group interaction, post-hoc comparisons showed that in the 
punishing condition, acceptance rates for controls and patients were not significantly different 
(2 (1)=0.14, p=0.916). However, in the prosocial condition patients accepted significantly 
less offers than controls (2 (1)=13.72, p<0.001). Controls demonstrated significantly lower 
acceptance rates (a difference of 37.2% [23.5%-50.1%]) in the punishing versus prosocial 
condition (2 (1)=37.09, p<0.0001). Patient acceptance rates were also significantly lower in 
the punishing versus prosocial conditions, 14.9% difference [7.3%-22.5%]  (2 (1)=19.32, 
p<0.0001). Importantly, the effect size of the change in patients’ acceptance rates (across 
conditions) is significantly less than that of the controls 22.2% [7.5%-37.0%] (2 (1)=8.75, 
p<0.01). Hence, patients were significantly less influenced by condition than controls 
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indicating a muted response to the prosocial framing. (See Supplementary Figure 1, panels b) 
and c) for acceptance rates at each offer level of the social framing conditions).    
 
Comparisons with the baseline condition 
Comparisons with baseline are shown in Figure 4. The overall three-way interaction of 
fairness level, social framing and group was not significant (2 (2)=3.37, p=0.186). The 
fairness by group interaction was not significant (2 (1)=0.45, p=0.5), indicating that 
acceptance rate changes from the baseline in both controls and patients were modulated to a 
similar degree by fairness level. By contrast, social framing interacted with fairness (2 
(2)=26.15, p<0.001). Also, there was a significant social framing by group interaction (2 
(2)=9.34, p<0.01), indicating that the social framing condition modulated the change in 
acceptance rates from the baseline for both groups differentially. 
 
 Post-hoc comparisons revealed the following findings. For fair offers, in both the prosocial 
or punishing conditions neither control nor patient acceptance rates differed significantly 
from baseline (p-values ranging from 0.93 to 1.00) (see Figure 4, panel a). For unfair offers in 
the punishing condition, patients accepted on average 11% more than their baseline levels, 
although this difference was not significant (2 (1)=2.33, p=0.663). This contrasts with the 
control group whose acceptance rates for unfair offers in the punishing condition were 
virtually identical to the baseline rates, a difference of only 0.06% (2 (1)=0.00, p=1.00)  
(See Figure 4, panel b). For unfair offers in the prosocial condition, patients’ acceptance rates 
were significantly higher than their baseline levels by 28.5% (2 (1)=15.57, p<0.001). 
Controls’ unfair acceptance rates were also significantly higher than their baseline levels by 
43.1% (2 (1)=44.99, p<0.0001) (See Figure 4, panel b). For the unfair condition, we 
compared the difference between acceptance rates in the punishing condition versus 
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acceptance rates in the prosocial condition. Both groups accepted significantly more offers in 
the prosocial condition, compared to the punishing condition, with controls accepting 43% 
more  [27.0%-59.0%] (2 (1)=36.26, p<0.0001), but patients accepting only 17.1% more 
[8.1%-26.0%] (2 (1)=18.43, p<0.0001). The magnitude of this change differed significantly 
between the groups (difference: 25.9% [8.8%-43.0%] (2 (1)=8.81, p<0.01), consistent with 
the patients displaying a divergent response to social framing, characterised by a tendency for 
higher acceptance rates in the punishing condition and a muted response to the prosocial 
condition.     
 
Relationship to empathy 
To investigate the effect of empathy on acceptance rates in the patients, we estimated a GEE 
logistic model using a three-way factorial design of the fairness level, social framing 
condition and the level of empathy impairment (minimal vs. severe). We categorised patients 
on the basis of their score on the CBI-R empathy item (ranging from 0 to 4, higher scores 
indicating more significant impairment). Minimal impairment was defined as values ranging 
from 0-3 and severe impairment as values of 4. A total of nine patients were in the minimally 
impaired range (three patients were rated 0, one patient scored 1, two patients had a score of 
2, and three had a score of 3), the remaining thirteen patients were in the severely impaired 
range, with scores of 4. The three-way interaction between empathy, fairness, and social 
framing condition was not significant (2 (1)=0.78, p=0.377). We found significant main 
effects of empathy (2 (1)=5.03, p<0.05), fairness (2 (1)=22.89, p<0.001) and social 
framing (2 (1)=9.88, p<0.01). Two-way interactions between empathy and social framing, 
and fairness and social framing, were not significant (2 (1)=1.21, p=0.271 and (2 (1)=0.75, 
p=0.377, respectively). However, we found a significant interaction between empathy and 
fairness (2(1)=4.83, p<0.05).  
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Post-hoc comparisons within the significant empathy and fairness interaction revealed that 
for unfair offers, those with severely impaired empathy had significantly lower acceptance 
rates than those with minimal impairment (39.0% vs. 61.3% accepted; 2 (1)=6.46, p<0.05). 
However, no difference was found between severely impaired and minimally impaired 
subjects for fair offers (82.2% vs. 74.4% accepted; 2 (1)=0.52, p=0.718). Together 
indicating that reduced empathy was specifically associated with lower acceptance rates for 
unfair offers.    
 
Ultimatum Game – control variables 
Here we report analysis of the gender and cognitive control variables that were included in 
the main analysis. For the individual cognitive variables, no effect of TMT-B or RAVLT 
delay was found on acceptance rates (coeff.=0.002, z= 0.10, p = 0.918 and coeff.=-0.026, z= -
0.77, p = 0.442 respectively), however there was a significant main effect for digit span total 
(coeff.=0.173, z= 3.45, p <0.01), indicating that the higher the digit span of a subject, the 
higher their acceptance rate across conditions. The main effect of gender was significant (2 
(1) = 5.93, p< 0.05), as was the interaction with fairness (2 (1) = 5.16, p<0.05). Post-hoc 
comparisons reveal that for unfair offers males had significantly higher acceptance rates, 
62.6%, than females 45.7% (2(1)=6.99, p<0.05). No significant difference was found in 
acceptances rates for fair offers (2(1)=0.06, p=0.805). The interactions of gender with 
condition and group were not statistically significant (2 (2) = 2.66, p = 0.265 and 2 (1) = 
1.13, p = 0.289, respectively). The lack of significant interaction between gender and 
condition suggests that a gender effect is unlikely to account for specific deficits on the social 
aspect of the tasks exhibited by bvFTD patients. However, future studies with equal gender 
distributions will be important to explore potential within-group variations in performance on 
the Ultimatum Game in bvFTD. 
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VBM analysis – Atrophy pattern in bvFTD group 
The bvFTD group was initially contrasted with controls to reveal overall patterns of grey 
matter intensity decrease in the fronto-subcortical mask. Patients showed characteristic 
patterns of atrophy throughout the fronto-subcortical regions of interest. For details, see 
Supplementary Table 1 and Supplementary Figure 2.   
 
VBM analysis – Ultimatum Game 
Regions of decreased grey matter intensity associated with higher acceptance rates for unfair 
offers in the punishing condition are shown in Table 2, section a) and Figure 5, panel a). 
These regions included the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right inferior frontal gyrus, 
anterior cingulate and paracingulate cortices and medial orbitofrontal cortex and subgenual 
cingulate. The regions of decreased grey matter intensity associated with lower acceptance 
rates in the prosocial condition are shown in Table 2, section b) and Figure 5, panel b). These 
regions included a large cluster encompassing the left dorsal putamen and left anterior 
insular, other regions included the right dorsal posterior putamen and caudate body, also the 
left lateral orbitofrontal cortex. (See Supplementary Table 2 for reports of within group 
correlations between grey matter intensity and behavioural scores).   
 
Discussion  
We present a novel neuroeconomic task to investigate normative social decision-making 
behaviour in a neurodegenerative lesion model characterised by gross social dysfunction 
(bvFTD). For the first time, we describe the decision-making behaviour in bvFTD across 
three social normative scenarios: fairness, punishment and prosocial. Behaviourally, we 
demonstrate intact responses to fairness in the patients. In contrast, they show muted 
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expression of punishing and prosocial behaviour, associated with discrete regions of fronto-
striatal atrophy. Our findings suggest that whilst expression of basic normative behaviour 
may remain intact in bvFTD, more complex normative behaviours that rely on the integration 
of social contextual information are compromised.        
 
Equivalent responses to fairness between patients and controls may, at first glance, seem 
difficult to reconcile, considering that core emotion processing regions known to underpin 
fairness behaviour are compromised in bvFTD. Previous investigations in ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex lesion patients, or during dietary serotonin depletion, indicate that emotion 
regulatory mechanisms interact with perceptions of unfairness. Accordingly, exaggerated 
emotional reactions lead to elevated rejection rates (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007, Crockett et 
al., 2008, Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2012, Crockett et al., 2013). In contrast, the well-described 
blunting of emotional reactivity in bvFTD (Sturm et al., 2006) can explain why we do not see 
those same elevated rejection rates as patients with discrete prefrontal lesions, who often 
manifest exaggerated anger and irritability in frustrating situations (Koenigs and Tranel, 
2007). An interaction between emotional blunting and fairness behaviour has not been 
established in the literature. Our findings raise the possibility that fairness behaviour may not 
be similarly moderated by reduced emotional reactivity as it is by exaggerated emotional 
states. This supports that conclusion that perception of fairness is a dissociable construct from 
emotional state, and that it is maintained in bvFTD.   
 
In contrast, patients differed from controls in terms of their engagement in either punishing or 
prosocial behaviour. These deviations from normative behaviour were associated with 
specific regions of fronto-striatal grey matter atrophy. In the punishing condition (i.e., 
framing proposers as rich to provoke an increased sense of unfairness, and encourage higher 
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rejection rates), bvFTD patients showed a different pattern to controls, by a tendency to 
accept more than their baseline levels. This contrasted with controls’ acceptance rates, which 
were more in keeping with their baseline levels – suggesting that controls’ responses were not 
modulated by information framing proposers as rich. The extent that patients’ acceptance 
rates were elevated relative to their baseline levels was correlated with atrophy particularly in 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex regions (medial orbitofrontal/subgenual cortex, mid/anterior 
cingulate) but also in the right inferior frontal gyrus and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  
 
Although the punishing condition did not induce punishment behaviour in controls, bvFTD 
patients’ tendency to accept more in this condition suggests a potential ‘misuse’ of social 
contextual information, whereby potentially negative social contextual information is not 
exploited to guide economic decisions. Such a finding is consistent with the commonly 
noticed financial gullibility of bvFTD patients. Maladaptive financial decision making in 
bvFTD is pervasive in both everyday life and experimental contexts (Manes et al., 2010, 
Manes et al., 2011, Perry et al., 2013, Chiong et al., 2014). Extravagant spending, economic 
negligence and financial vulnerability can emerge long before a bvFTD diagnosis is 
achieved. A potentially compromised ability to integrate negative social cues with economic 
decisions warrants further investigation in bvFTD, as it may emerge as a critical area for 
early diagnostic assessment. 
 
Our imaging findings for the punishing condition reveal a putative neural network that could 
underpin patients’ inability to effectively employ negative social contextual information. The 
extent to which patients were less likely to engage in punishing behaviour was mediated by 
atrophy in regions at the intersection of emotion- and value-based social decision-making, 
namely the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and mid/anterior cingulate. This is consistent with 
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the involvement of these regions in evaluating both reward and punishment, and integrating 
value with social and emotional information to inform subsequent behaviour (Rushworth et 
al., 2007, Etkin et al., 2011, Apps et al., 2013). The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, in 
particular, emerges as an important integrative hub for social behaviour, given its role in 
person perception and mentalising (Amodio and Frith, 2006). 
 
We also show that the right inferior frontal gyrus, and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
atrophy related to a reduced tendency to engage in punishing behaviour. Bilateral dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex activation has been implicated in social norm compliance (Spitzer et al., 
2007), and non-invasive brain stimulation to disrupt the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
alters social norm compliance in economic decision-making (Knoch et al., 2006, Ruff et al., 
2013). One study using the Ultimatum Game demonstrated a significant decline in rejection 
rates of unfair offers after transcranial magnetic stimulation to the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, which induced decreased activity of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
and posterior ventromedial cortex, and connectivity between them (Baumgartner et al., 
2011). Our results corroborate that combined ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
atrophy is associated with an unwillingness to engage in punishing behaviour. In the context 
of the Ultimatum Game, rejecting unfair offers entails a more immediate inhibition of self-
interest, as monetary gain is foregone in order to penalise the proposer’s violation of the 
fairness norm. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been linked to the ability to override 
self-interest via functional imaging and electrical stimulation studies (Rilling and Sanfey, 
2011), using a structural lesion model we highlight that the right inferior frontal gyrus may be 
a critical locus involved in this process. The right inferior frontal gyrus is implicated in 
various forms of inhibitory control (Aron, 2011). Inhibitory dysfunction is well described in 
bvFTD (O'Callaghan et al., 2013a) and has been linked to orbitofrontal and inferior frontal 
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cortex abnormalities (Peters et al., 2006, Hornberger et al., 2011, O'Callaghan et al., 2013b, 
Hughes et al., 2015). Together, the structural neural correlates we describe here converge 
across circuitry involved in inhibition and emotion/reward processing, confirming a role for 
this network in mediating alterations to normative social function in bvFTD.   
 
 In terms of the prosocial condition (i.e., to frame proposers as being ‘in need’ to encourage 
higher acceptance rates), patients showed a tendency toward prosocial behaviour, albeit to a 
lesser extent than controls. The extent to which patients deviated from normative responses in 
this condition, by accepting less than their baseline levels, was associated with atrophy in 
dorsal striatal regions, left anterior insula and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex. A proximate 
mechanism for prosocial behaviour is thought to be the subjective reward derived from 
helping another (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). In line with our finding that dorsal striatum 
atrophy mediated the muted prosocial response, functional activation studies implicate the 
striatum in social reward processing (Fehr and Camerer, 2007, Bhanji and Delgado, 2014), 
although the exact subdivisions associated with social rewards have not been established. 
Currently, both dorsal and ventral striatum have been linked to social reward valuation and 
learning, vicarious social reward, and signalling reward inequality (Báez-Mendoza and 
Schultz, 2013). However, convergent evidence from non-social paradigms implicates the 
dorsal striatum in signalling reward- and motivation-based information that drives subsequent 
action selection (O'Doherty, 2004, O'Doherty et al., 2004, Balleine et al., 2007). Taken 
together, the dorsal striatum may play a unique role in computing social reward and biasing 
action-output geared to seek rewarding social interactions.  
 
Activation in the anterior insula has consistently been linked with Ultimatum Game 
performance in healthy people (Sanfey et al., 2003, Tabibnia et al., 2008, Civai et al., 2012, 
  O’Callaghan et al.  
24 
Corradi-Dell'Acqua et al., 2013). A strong association between the anterior insula and 
negative emotional states (Damasio et al., 2000) was taken as evidence that this region 
mediated the negative emotional reactions that led to rejecting unfair offers. However, an 
alternative interpretation is that the insula has a broader role in both detecting inequality and 
motivating decisions to restore inequality (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011, Gabay et al., 2014). Our 
findings show that anterior insula damage may not necessarily affect normative responses to 
fairness, but that it is related to a reduced expression of prosocial behaviour, consistent with 
its hypothesised broader role. In keeping with our results, both the left lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex and right insula have been implicated in norm-abiding social behaviour (Spitzer et al., 
2007).  
 
The expression of normative social behaviours relevant to explore in bvFTD, as the human 
tendency to engage in fair, prosocial behaviour offers a window into one of the cardinal 
symptoms of the disease – reduced empathy. Our findings show that patients with lower 
levels of everyday empathic concern were more likely to reject unfair offers. Rather than 
being consistent with an elevated emotional response to unfairness or insensitivity to reward, 
we would suggest that this finding supports a diminished response to normative social 
expectations. This is consistent with a recent study illustrating that, in healthy individuals, 
trait levels of empathic concern predicts the tendency to engage in altruistic behaviour during 
a social interaction paradigm (FeldmanHall et al., 2015). Objective assessment of empathy 
continues to pose a challenge in bvFTD, however our findings suggest that normative social 
behaviours on the Ultimatum Game may provide a useful surrogate for everyday empathy. As 
our current results are based on a single, clinical assessment of empathy, it will important for 
future studies to undertake a more in-depth assessment of empathy. Given that empathy is a 
complex, multifaceted process that also draws upon other abilities that can be affected by 
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dementia including language, motivation and mentalisation (Decety et al., 2012), future 
studies should explore the association between such abilities, different aspects of empathy, 
and how they relate to the expression of normative behaviour in neuropsychiatric conditions.  
 
Considering our findings across the three scenarios of social norm compliance, expression of 
normative behaviour in the patients was not uniformly impaired. Engaging purely in fairness-
based behaviour on the Ultimatum Game does not involve complex social computations. In 
contrast, engaging in prosocial or punishing behaviour relies on the effective integration of 
social contextual information to guide behaviour. Our finding that normative behaviour in the 
patients was disrupted when additional social processing was required is consistent with a 
recent hypothesis proposing that a range of symptoms in bvFTD may be underscored by a 
generalised deficit in the ability to effectively integrate social context and behaviour (Ibañez 
and Manes, 2012). 
 
A potential limitation of our study design is that we did not include a control condition in the 
Ultimatum Game that incorporated additional information that was non-social, thereby being 
unable to directly distinguish whether the effects seen in the reappraisal conditions stemmed 
from social norm deficits, or simply difficulty in incorporating extra information. However, 
the inclusion of cognitive variables in our main analysis allowed us to control for the effects 
of cognitive dysfunction. Our results indicated that generalised cognitive dysfunction did not 
mediate patients’ divergent performance in the social framing conditions – emphasising that 
our results are consistent with a specific deficit in integrating social context into decision-
making. Nevertheless, future studies in bvFTD patients, and indeed in other 
neurodegenerative groups, which are matched for gender to control for potential 
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heterogeneity within the patient sample, are necessary to replicate and extend the results we 
describe here. 
 
In conclusion, we have developed a novel neuroeconomic task to provide insights into 
complex social dysfunction in a neurodegenerative lesion model (bvFTD). In doing so, we 
have identified discrete deficits in patients’ ability to integrate social contextual information 
to guide normative decision-making behaviour, associated with abnormalities in key fronto-
striatal regions. This “social norm compliance” network represents an important target for 
future research into disordered norm compliance in bvFTD. From a wider theoretical 
standpoint, these findings speak to on going appeals that norm-based decision-making 
research be extended to clinical populations (Ruff et al., 2013, Sanfey et al., 2014), in an 
effort to determine causal mechanisms of social norm compliance, and its relevance to 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1 – Example of trials in the Ultimatum Game 
Panel a) illustrates a trial in the baseline condition, where the participant has accepted the 
offer. Panels b) and c) illustrate trials from the prosocial and punishing social framing 
conditions where the offers were accepted and rejected, respectively.  
 
Figure 2 – Baseline acceptance rates in the Ultimatum Game 
Percentage of offers accepted in the baseline condition for fair versus unfair offer amounts. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Figure 3 – Social framing acceptance rates in the Ultimatum Game 
Percentage of fair versus unfair offers accepted in the prosocial and punishing social framing 
conditions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Figure 4 – Change from baseline acceptance rates in the social framing conditions 
Panels show the change in acceptance rates from baseline in the social framing conditions, 
represented separately as fair (panel a) versus unfair (panel b) offer amounts. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals.    
 
Figure 5 – Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) correlates for change from baseline scores 
in the social framing conditions   
Region of interest Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) results showing areas of significant 
grey matter intensity decrease correlating with a) Punishing – higher acceptance rates for 
unfair offers in the punishing condition (red-yellow), showing significant clusters in i) and ii) 
orbitofrontal/Subcallosal cortices; iii) anterior cingulate/paracingulate cortices; iv) right 
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inferior frontal gyrus; and b) Prosocial – lower acceptance rates for unfair offers in the 
prosocial condition (blue-light blue), showing significant clusters in i) left dorsal putamen; ii) 
right dorsal posterior putamen; iii) left anterior insula; iv) left lateral orbitofrontal cortex. 
Results uncorrected at p < .001 and at a cluster threshold of greater than 35 contiguous 
voxels.  
 
Supplementary Figure 1 – Acceptance rates for each offer amount 
Acceptance rates shown separately for offer amounts across the conditions. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean. In the baseline condition, within both the patient and 
control groups, subjects demonstrated equivalent acceptance rates for ‘fair’ ($5-$5, $6-$4) 
offers (p values > .3). Both groups also showed equivalent acceptance rates across the 
‘unfair’ ($7-$3, $8-$2, $9-$1) offers (p values > .2). 
 
Supplementary Figure 2 – Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) showing regions of 
decreased grey matter in bvFTD patients 
Region of interest VBM results showing areas of significant grey matter intensity decrease 
within the fronto-subcortical mask for bvFTD patients relative to controls. All results 
corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE) at p < .05 and at a cluster threshold of greater than 
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